Even with killing of Nasrallah, Hezbollah nowhere near defeated

Within the span of a few weeks, Israel has decimated the upper echelon of Lebanese Hezbollah’s command structure, including killing its leader, Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. The longtime head of one of the world’s most comprehensive terrorist organizations met his demise after the Israeli air force dropped dozens of 2,000-pound “bunker buster” bombs on Hezbollah’s headquarters in Beirut. There is little doubt that Hezbollah will now face a significant challenge as it attempts to reconstitute its ranks.

And while many in Israel and the United States are rejoicing, the stark reality is that Hezbollah will eventually emerge from this recent round of fighting severely weakened but capable of rebuilding. After all, Hezbollah is the crown jewel in Iran’s so-called axis of resistance, and just as it did after the 34-day war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, Tehran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will allocate sufficient resources and training to ensure Hezbollah's survival.

Nasrallah’s likely successor is Hashem Safieddine, head of Hezbollah’s Executive Council and member of its Jihad Council, who is also an essential decision-maker in terms of the group’s military operations. Safieddine’s son is married to the daughter of the late Qasem Soleimani, head of the IRGC Quds Force, which further cements the link to Iran. Also instrumental to the group’s revival is Naim Qassem, its deputy secretary-general, who is deeply loyal to Iran.

Tactical success vs. winning strategy

There is a lively debate in counterterrorism circles about the efficacy of decapitation strikes, which are targeted assassinations that eliminate the top leaders of terrorist and insurgent organizations. The scholarly consensus is that, too often, decapitation strikes are viewed as a panacea, but this confuses tactical success with a winning strategy. Removing savvy and charismatic militant chieftains is a necessary, but not sufficient, counterterrorism measure. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in October 2019, nearly five years ago, and the Islamic State (ISIS), though attenuated, demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt and evolve.

Hezbollah’s predecessor, Islamic Jihad, first emerged more than four decades ago following Israel’s 1982 invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon, which lasted for 18 years before the Israelis withdrew unilaterally in 2000. Once described as a ragtag militia, today, Hezbollah functions more akin to a state within a state, boasts 30,000 fully trained men under arms, and possesses an arsenal of 150,000 rockets, drones and precision-guided missiles. And, with dozens of its members sitting in Lebanon’s parliament, Hezbollah is inextricably linked with the Lebanese state.

Hezbollah is even more durable than terrorist groups like ISIS or al-Qaeda because it is an integral part of the sociopolitical fabric of Lebanon. Hezbollah operates a vast social services network throughout Lebanon and even has its own development foundation, Jihad al-Bina, which focuses on infrastructure construction, educational programs for Lebanese youth and assisting refugees. After each conflagration with Israel, Hezbollah helps to fix the damaged and destroyed homes of Lebanese Shiites, enhancing its legitimacy and winning hearts and minds.

Hezbollah has now suffered serious setbacks with the loss of Nasrallah and other high-ranking leaders, including organizational strategist Fuad Shukr (killed in July), commander of the Southern Front Ali Karari and head of the group’s elite special forces Radwan unit Ibrahim Akil. But the group has weathered the loss of high-ranking commanders before, including its former leader, Abbas al-Musawi, killed by Israel in 1992, and its most notorious operational commander, Imad Mugniyeh, blown up by a car bomb in Damascus in 2008, the result of a joint CIA-Mossad operation.

Ground invasion: A gift to Hezbollah

There are a number of other factors that will contribute to Hezbollah’s longevity in both the short and long term. In the immediate, Hezbollah will seek to use its sophisticated propaganda apparatus, which includes its own television station, Al-Manar, capitalizing on growing outrage against Israel throughout the Arab and Islamic world. Beginning with the pager and walkie-talkie attacks last week, combined with casualties from last weekend’s bombings, scores of civilians have been killed and hundreds wounded, including women and children.

What’s more, it appears that Israel is far from finished with its military campaign and could be preparing to launch a ground invasion of southern Lebanon. This would be a gift for Hezbollah, which would be fighting on its home turf and would use the incursion as an opportunity to wage a protracted guerilla war against the Israeli military, relying on classic insurgent tactics that play to the group’s asymmetric advantage. After the July 2006 war, Hezbollah emerged battered but was buoyed by widespread popular support among the Sunni Arab street, admired for standing up to Israel.

In the long term, Hezbollah will persist because of the country within which it operates. By most metrics, Lebanon remains a failed state, with a government either unable or unwilling to provide for its citizens, a military that lacks a monopoly on the use of force, and glaring capacity gaps and functional holes that have provided Hezbollah with the operational space to fill the void, stepping in where the state is absent. Always conscious of shaping the next generation of fighters, Hezbollah operates a summer camp for children and has even developed first-person shooter video games to further indoctrinate Lebanon’s youth.

The next few months will be pivotal. Hezbollah needs to figure out how Israel was able to penetrate its organization so thoroughly. Its internal security unit has already begun conducting a mole hunt, searching for Hezbollah members who may be providing human intelligence to Israel. Beyond human sources, Israel can also marshal an impressive intelligence yield from spy satellites, drones and world-class hacking skills, led by its vaunted Unit 8200, known for its cutting-edge cyber capabilities.

Perhaps more than anything else, Hezbollah will endure because its raison d’etre — the reason for its very existence — is opposition to the state of Israel. Unlike Palestinian terrorist groups, which claim to be fighting for an independent Palestinian state, Hezbollah defines itself as a resistance movement against the Jewish state, making future conflict all but inevitable.

What Israel does next will help shape the future of Hezbollah and could, depending on how events transpire between now and the end of the year, fuel the group’s resurgence at a later date. The Israeli military colloquially refers to its frequent clashes with Hamas as “mowing the grass" — a problem to be managed, not solved. The same is true of Hezbollah, which, despite Israel’s current scorched earth offensive, will also grow back and could ultimately emerge even stronger than before.