It is no secret that after the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas was among those most pleased with Mohammed Morsi's 2012 victory in the Egyptian presidential elections. Morsi's selection followed fast on the heels of the movement's initial joy at parliamentary election results, which in turn were grounded in what it considers to be Muslim ethics. Hence, Hamas' greatest regional source of strength came to reside in Cairo. Hamas experienced something of a honeymoon following the ouster of the regime of Hosni Mubarak, which had been persistently hostile toward it.
In Egypt, Hamas believed that it had found suitable compensation (and more) for its loss of Syrian patronage when its leaders adopted a supportive position toward the popular revolution directed against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Indeed, its base in Damascus for the previous ten years had been predicated on a mutual interest -- joint hostility toward Israel -- and flew in the face of fundamental disagreement on religious ideology. Hamas' gradual shift toward other Arab capitals, including Cairo, contained elements of narrow self-interest as well as ideological and religious compatibility. This was particularly the case with Egypt, given that the Hamas government in Gaza considers itself the “legitimate offspring” of the Muslim Brotherhood.